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Third Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture, 13 May 2010 
Private International Law from the Equitable Jurisdiction: Imperialism, 
Universalism and Pluralism 
Dr Yeo Tiong Min, Yong Pung How Professor of Law 
School of Law, Singapore Management University 
Introduction 
1. One side-effect of globalization is increasing cross-border conflict arising from 
transactions between parties. Today, the courts have sophisticated tools to deal 
with such conflicts. The focus of this paper is the interrelation between the court’s 
approach when dealing with problems in its equitable jurisdiction, and its approach 
when dealing with cross-border problems. 
2. In 1994, the Singapore Court of Appeal (Yong Pung How CJ, Karthigesu and LP 
Thean JJA) delivered the judgment in Thahir Kartika Ratna v PT Pertambanan Minyak 
dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina),1 which today remains a leading Commonwealth 
authority for choice of law for restitutionary claims.2 It stirred great interest in both 
restitution and conflict of laws circles.  
3. I was, however, more fascinated by a point that did not attract much attention at 
that time. Various claims had been made by an employer to reclaim bribes received 
by an employee and a subsequent recipient. Some were common law claims, others 
were equitable claims. In the High Court, Lai Kew Chai J stated that once the 
equitable jurisdiction of the court was invoked, the law of the forum applies to the 
claim. On the other hand, the Court of Appeal characterised the equitable claims as 
“restitution” and applied the choice of law rules in restitution to the claims. Both 
pointed to Singapore law, so nobody made much fuss about it. But which was the 
correct or better approach? I thought that it raised a question of principle that 
could have tremendous practical consequences. When an opportunity arose, I 
spent some time in Oxford researching the question. 
                                                            
1 [1994] 3 SLR(R) 312, [1994] 3 SLR 257 (CA). Noted in J Bird, “Bribes, Restitution and the Conflict of 
Laws” [1995] LMCLQ 198, and see also A Briggs, “Restitution Meets the Conflict of Laws” [1994] RLR 
94. It was also a seminal case in the law of restitution in imposing a constructive trust on bribe monies, 
but in this respect it was somewhat eclipsed by A-G for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC NZ). 
2 L Collins (gen ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins: The Conflict of Laws (London: Thomson, 14th ed, 2006) at [34-
003]; P North and JJ Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law (London: Butterworths, 13th ed, 
1999) at 687. 
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4. The conclusion, published in 2004,3 was that generally the state of authorities in 
the Commonwealth was very unclear, there was little academic treatment of the 
subject,4 and it was important to look at the matter from first principles in the light 
of the authorities. 
Equity 
5. Common law systems like Singapore derive their legal systems from the English 
system. A unique feature of the common law system is its duality: common law 
and equity. This dual system of judge-made law is the source of much puzzlement 
to civil lawyers as well as to lay persons, and indeed even to common lawyers. Sir 
George Jessel, Master of the Rolls who supervised the implementation of the 
merger of the English courts, was reputed to have said that “no one can be 
expected to understand equity until he is forty”.5 Today, with widespread university 
education in the law, it is not generally believed that understanding of equity is 
monopolised by those of middle-age and above.6 Nevertheless it is a challenge. 
The system has been analogised to a mathematical system which contains blue 
numbers and red numbers, and where the colours have an important effect on 
calculations, and where there are complex rules on how the blue and red numbers 
may or may not be combined.7 
6. Common law was the king’s justice, or the law of the land, as applied by judges of 
the country. Equity was also the king’s justice, but it represented a “higher” justice; 
it was a force to temper the common law when it became too harsh or too rigid. 
This idea of duality of justice dates back to Aristotle, and is not unknown in civil 
law system, but it finds a unique form of expression in common law countries. 
There are three unique features of equity that require emphasis. First, equity is seen 
as a distinct body of jurisprudence, and its methodology and principles are not 
always the same as those of the common law. Secondly, equity was historically 
                                                            
3 TM Yeo, Choice of Law for Equitable Doctrines (Oxford: OUP 2004).  
4 Among the few were: RW White, “Equitable Obligations in Private International Law: The Choice of 
Law” (1986) 11 Syd LR 92; L Barnard, “Choice of Law in Equitable Wrongs – A Comparative Analysis” 
[1992] CLJ 474. Much had been written about the private international law aspect of express trusts, but 
that is a different story. 
5 “We have the uncertain authority of Laski, repeating a story of Lord Maugham’s, for Sir George Jessel’s 
view that no one can be expected to understand equity until he is forty.” Heydon, Gummow and Austin, 
Cases and Materials on Equity (1st ed, 1975), p(v); and Gummow, “Equity: Too Successful?”(2003) 77 ALJ 
30 at 31. 
6 Heydon, Gummow and Austin, Cases and Materials on Equity (Sydney: Butterworths, 1st ed, 1975), p(v); 
and Gummow, “Equity: Too Successful?”(2003) 77 ALJ 30 at 31. 
7 J Getzler, “Patterns of Fusion”, in P Birks (ed), The Classification of Obligations (P Birks ed) (Oxford: OUP, 
1997), ch 7. See also S Worthington, Equity (Oxford: OUP, 2003) at 2-6. 
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administered from a separate court (the Court of Chancery) that was distinct from 
other courts. Indeed, it is impossible to define an “equitable” principle except by 
reference to the origin of the principle from this jurisdiction. These separate courts 
have merged for more than 140 years,8 but the unified court continues to wear 
different hats; it applies common law rules in its common law jurisdiction, and 
principles of equity in its equitable jurisdiction. The merger was only of 
administration. Thirdly, while the objective of equity was to improve upon the 
common law, its technique was to subvert it.9 The politics of the time prevented 
the equity courts from directly contradicting the common law courts; so the court 
acted on the person (thus: equity acts in personam), preventing him from asserting 
his common law rights. Of course, this created a conflict between the courts, and it 
was resolved in favour of equity,10 a position that continues to prevail today.11 
Thus: if there is a conflict between common law and equity, equity prevails.  
7. When there are two sets of rules which say different things about the same matter, 
it is necessary to have rules which determine which set of rules will apply in any 
given case. The two main principles in common law systems are deceptively simple: 
(1) the common law always applies; whether equity also applies depends on 
whether the equitable jurisdiction has been properly invoked; and (2) when there is 
a conflict, equity prevails. Academic debate rages on the extent to which there 
should continue to be two sets of rules. On one side are the “fusionists”, who 
point out that the duality is an accident of history, and who argue that the common 
law system is mature enough to deal with problems with one set of rules rather 
than two. On the other side are the “separatists” who argue against the “fusion 
fallacy” – obtaining a legal result that that is not justifiable by reference to the 
distinct lines of jurisprudence in the common law and equitable jurisdictions when 
considered separately. Academics have nearly come to blows arguing this question. 
Courts, however, remain bound by doctrine and precedent to maintain the two 
separate jurisdictions. 
Private International Law (Conflict of Laws) 
8. Rules of private international law have been created by the courts to deal with 
cross-border disputes. There are three types of questions: (1) whether the court can 
assume and will exercise jurisdiction to determine a dispute between the parties, or 
                                                            
8 In the UK: Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 and 1875; In Singapore: Courts Ordinance (No III of 
1878) and Civil Law Ordinance (No IV of 1878), s 10. 
9 M Halliwell, Equity and Good Conscience in a Contemporary Society (London: Old Bailey, 1997) at 6. 
10 J Getzler, “Patterns of Fusion”, in P Birks (ed), The Classification of Obligations (P Birks ed) (Oxford 
University Press, 1997)  at 182-183. 
11 In Singapore: Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed), s 4(13). 
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leave the matter to be resolved by the court of another country more closely 
connected with the dispute (jurisdiction); (2) if it is going to hear the case, which 
country’s law the court will apply to determine the dispute (choice of law); and (3) 
the legal effect of a foreign judgment in Singapore (foreign judgments). This paper 
is concerned primarily with the second class of questions. 
9. From very early times, English courts have recognised that it is not always the right 
thing to do apply English law to foreigners or to transactions occurring in foreign 
lands. Today, the common law has very sophisticated choice of law rules. It runs 
from the basic assumption that the application of the law of the forum does not 
always give the right answer in disputes involving foreign elements, and that 
“conflicts justice” requires the application of the rules of the legal system most 
closely connected with the dispute. In other words, it proceeds on the basis of 
pluralism and international comity. No one country’s “justice” is necessarily better 
than another’s.12  
10. Choice of law is concerned with the question of which country’s law is to apply to 
an issue in dispute. Dean Prosser once said of choice of law rules in particular: 
“The realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with  quaking  
quagmires,  and  inhabited  by  learned  but eccentric  professors  who  theorise  
about  mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon.  The 
ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost when engulfed and entangled in it.”13 
11. We do not need to reach eighty before getting near to understanding. Choice of 
law is best understood as a methodology. The choice of law process can be 
understood in five steps: (1) characterisation of the issue in dispute; (2) 
identification of the connecting factor(s) associated with the category in question; 
(3) the identification of the applicable law in that legal system; (4) the application, if 
necessary, of rules of the forum rules which are mandatory in the international 
sense that they override the choice of law process; and (5) the rejection, if 
necessary, of foreign law if the consequence of its application is contrary to 
fundamental public policies of the forum.  The first three steps acknowledge the 
pluralism of values in different legal systems. The last two recognise that there may 
be certain values which the court may regard as universal, or more commonly, as 
being so important to the moral, social or economic interests of the forum that 
foreign law to the contrary cannot be accepted. 
                                                            
12 In modern times, this same notion of international comity and pluralism has spawned much litigation 
about where to conduct litigation (natural forum). 
13 William L. Prosser, “Interstate Publication” (1953) 51 Mich L Rev 959 at 971. 
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12. The categories for choice of law are well-documented in textbooks on private 
international law. The key point to note is the objective of the characterisation; the 
categories serve no particular purpose other than to assist the court to identify the 
law most appropriate to apply to the dispute in question.14 They are not defined by 
conceptual parameters, let alone domestic doctrines. Thus, we know that an 
agreement without consideration is not a contract as characterised under domestic 
common law. Nevertheless, it is a “contract” for choice of law purposes,15 because 
agreements of this type serve the same function in the legal system as “contracts” 
in the domestic sense within the common law. In other words, the functions of the 
rules prevail over the labels attached to them.16 
Choice of Law for Equity 
13. Very sophisticated principles and rules have been developed to deal with choice of 
law problems. There is, however, a large gap when it comes to questions involving 
the potential application of the equitable principles of the forum (or of a foreign 
country). The question basically is: when a litigant is asking to invoke the equitable 
jurisdiction of the court, does the court apply choice of law at all? If so, does it 
apply a different set of rules from when the equitable jurisdiction is not invoked? 
14. The seventeenth and eighteenth century had seen a flurry of activity in the English 
Chancery Court involving disputes between (mostly English) parties relating to 
foreign immovable property, mostly in the colonies. 17  There was (and is) a 
prohibition in the common law courts against the assumption of jurisdiction to 
hear disputes involving title to foreign lands.18 Nevertheless, the English Chancery 
Court took jurisdiction in many of these cases, not contradicting the common law 
prohibition, but on the basis that it was acting on the conscience of the defendant. 
In almost all the cases, it applied English law. These decisions should be 
understood in context of the politics and economics of those times. In those days, 
the English courts generally had scant regard for foreign courts, especially those in 
their colonies. It was the height of the English empire, and English law was 
synonymous with universal justice and right. Economically, the resolution of these 
disputes in a fashion familiar to Englishmen was important to raise the level of 
confidence of the venture capitalists in those days, to aid in the expansion of the 
                                                            
14 Raiffeisen Zentrabank Osterreich AG v Five Start Trading LLC (The Mount I) [2001] EWCA Civ 68, [2001] 
QB 825. 
15 Re Bonacina [1912] 2 Ch 394 (CA). 
16 See also Goh Suan Hee v Teo Cher Teck [2010] 1 SLR 367 (CA). 
17 The cases are legion. Penn v Baltimore (1750) 1 Ves Sen 444, 27 ER 1132 exemplifies. 
18 As restated in British South Africa Co v Companhia de Moçambique [1893] AC 602 (The Moçambique rule). 
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empire. This was the imperialist angle to the problem, and no more needs to be 
said about it. 
15. These cases decreased in significance with the decline of the British Empire. 
Judicial systems in the colonies became more developed, and people encountered 
difficulties in enforcing judgments involving foreign land in the country where the 
land is situated. Its most important heritage is the principle for taking jurisdiction 
in personam in spite of the presence of foreign immovable property, which remains 
important today.19  
16. The principles of equity were originally developed primarily for the protection of 
land, that being the most important repository of wealth in those days. With land 
disputes going local, principles of equity generally stayed out of private 
international law. Its significance for choice of law purposes resurfaced in the 
1970’s and 80’s. This coincided with the phenomenal growth of equitable 
principles outside land law, and particularly into the commercial sphere: fiduciary 
duties; confidentiality duties; duties of skill and care; and duties owed by strangers 
to a trust or fiduciary duty. Increasingly, equitable principles were being called 
upon in litigation, including commercial litigation. This then spread to cross-border 
disputes. Today, it is commonplace for equitable principles to be invoked in cross-
border disputes concerning commercial and non-commercial transactions. 
17. How should the court approach the problem of choice of law for equitable 
doctrines? One extreme view is this: 
(1) Choice of law rules are rules of domestic law applied by the court to 
determine which system of law to apply to resolve the dispute; 
(2) The merger of courts only merged the administration; equitable jurisdiction 
remained distinct; 
(3) In the equitable jurisdiction, the court applied the law of the forum once it 
took jurisdiction, since it acted in personam; 
(4) Therefore the equitable principles of the forum must always apply; there is 
no choice of law question at all. 
18. The New South Wales Supreme Court took the strongest position on this issue: 
once jurisdiction was taken over the defendant, all principles of equity of the 
                                                            
19 See, eg, Singh v Singh [2006] WASC 182; Singh v Singh [2009] WASCA 53; Murakami v Wiryadi [2010] 
NSWSCA 7; R Griggs Group Ltd v Evans [2004] EWHC 1088 (Ch), [2005] Ch 153; Murakami Takako v 
Wiryadi Louise Maria [2009] 1 SLR(R) 508, [2009] 1 SLR 508 (CA). The enforcement of such judgments 
was discussed in the Second Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture. 
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forum applied.20 Reliance was placed on the cases involving jurisdiction in respect 
of foreign immovable property. The rationale was the universal values represented 
in the jurisprudence of equity. This proposition was affirmed in a number of cases 
in Australia.21 Equitable principles reflected universal values which caused them to 
override not only the domestic common law, but foreign law as well.22 
19. Another view, on the opposite end, is this:23 
(1) Choice of law rules are rules of domestic law applied by the court to 
determine which system of law to apply to resolve the dispute; 
(2) Applying choice of law in harmony with the common law is consistent with 
the precepts of equity and historically justified on the (albeit sparse) 
authorities; 
(3) Choice of law rules need to be applied before it is decided whether the 
equitable jurisdiction is even relevant; there should therefore be a unitary 
approach to choice of law and choice of law rules, and categories should not 
be specific to the domestic division between law and equity; 
(4) Equity is only relevant if it is part of the applicable law pointed to by the 
forum’s choice of law rule: there must be choice of law. 
20. The extreme view of the New South Wales Supreme Court has been rejected by 
the Singapore Court of Appeal in the important case of Rickshaw Investments Ltd v 
Nicolai Baron von Uexkull (hereafter Rickshaw).24 There, it rejected the universalism 
of equity; like the common law, the principles of equity must be subject to choice 
                                                            
20 “The Equity court has long taken the view that because it is a court of conscience and acts in personam, 
it has jurisdiction over persons within and subject to its jurisdiction to require them to act in accordance 
with the principles of equity administered by the court … The Equity Court determines according to its 
own law whether an equity exists, its nature and the remedy available….”: National Commercial Bank v 
Wimborne (1978) 5 BPR 11,958 at 11,982 (Holland J). 
21  “The origin of equity’s jurisdiction must also be borne in mind. The Lord Chancellor, with 
responsibility for the immortal souls of the subjects of the English King, made orders that such subjects 
behave in accordance with what all right thinking people knew (scio) with (con) God what was right. There 
was no concern with the souls of mere foreigners. …Thus equity is very much a local field of law.”: OZ-
US Film Productions Pty Ltd v Heath [2000] NSWSC 967 (Young J). “It is in my view arguable that the true 
position is no more than that, once a defendant is amenable to the in personam jurisdiction of the Court, 
that Defendant is subject to the equitable principles of the lex fori.”: OZ-US Film Productions Pty Ltd v Heath 
[2001] NSWSC 298 (McLaughlin M). “…[T]here is authority that Australian law will apply to both the 
substantive and procedural aspects of any proceeding here for fraud, alleging constructive trusts or 
seeking the remedy of tracing.”: Virgtel Ltd v Zabusky [2006] QSC 66. See also Young, Croft and Smith, 
On Equity (Sydney: Law Book Co, 2009), at [2.470]. 
22 Kavalee v Burbridge (1998) 43 NSWLR 422 (CA) at 438 (Mason P). 
23 See TM Yeo, Choice of Law for Equitable Doctrines (Oxford: OUP 2004); TM Yeo, “Choice of Law for 
Equity”, in S Degeling and J Edelman, Equity in Commercial Law (Sydney: Thomson, 2005). 
24 [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377, [2007] 1 SLR 377 (CA). Noted in A Briggs, “A Map or a Maze:Jurisdiciton and 
Choice of Law in the Court of Appeal” (2007) 11 SYBIL 123; TM Yeo, “The Effect of Contract on the 
Law Governing Claims in Torts and Equity” (2007) 9 YPIL 459. 
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of law rules.25  This was a matter of principle and international comity; it was 
recognition of the pluralism of values in different legal systems.  
21. More recently, the Court of Appeal found it necessary to re-affirm the principle 
that jurisdiction and choice of law are two separate questions.26 Just because the 
court assumes jurisdiction does not mean that it must apply its own domestic 
principles of equity.27 That the courts may have done so historically as a primitive 
proxy for choice of law does not mean that it must do the same today. In any 
event, most of the old jurisdiction cases can be rationalised on modern choice of 
law bases as being the application of English law as the law governing the 
contract28 or the law applicable to a wrong. 
22. Pluralism may yet triumph over universalism within the stronghold of equity 
jurisprudence, Australia, especially New South Wales where there was a separate 
chancery bar until the 1970’s. In Paramasivam v Flynn, the Federal Court of Australia, 
in a case involving a claim for damages for breach of fiduciary duty, (again relying 
on the jurisdiction cases) that the law of the forum must apply, considered that 
while choice of law may apply to fiduciary duties arising from contractual and 
corporate contexts, in other cases the principle was:29 
“the general application of the lex fori, subject, perhaps, to this: that where the 
circumstances giving rise to the asserted duty or the impugned conduct (or some 
of it) occurred outside the jurisdiction, the attitude of the law of the place where 
the circumstances arose or the conduct was undertaken is likely to be an 
important aspect of the factual circumstances by reference to which the Court 
determines whether a fiduciary relationship existed and, if so, the scope and 
content of the duties to which it gave rise.” 
23. That case was decided in 1998. It reflected universalism with some concession in 
exceptional cases to a discretionary form of pluralism. Much more recently 
                                                            
25 Insofar as rules of the forum (whether common law, equitable, or statutory) are regarded as universal 
and overriding, they may still apply as mandatory rules of an international nature or as fundamental public 
policy within the traditional conflict of laws methodology. 
26 Murakami Takako v Wiryadi Louise Maria [2009] 1 SLR(R) 508, [2009] 1 SLR 508 (CA). 
27 It disagreed (at [19]) with R Griggs Group Ltd v Evans [2004] EWHC 1088 (Ch), [2005] Ch 153 (at [110]) 
insofar as the suggested that the assumption of jurisdiction came with the choice of the law of the forum 
as the applicable law; but it may be that the court did not go further than suggesting that cases where the 
court assumed jurisdiction were those which involved “obligations” which happened to be governed by 
English law while those where the court refused jurisdiction involved questions of property law governed 
by foreign lex situs (at [111]-[113]).  
28 See Murakami v Wiryadi [2010] NSWCA 7 at [143]. 
29 (1998) 90 FCR 489 at 503. See TM Yeo, “Choice of Law for Fiduciary Duties” (1999) 115 LQR 571. 
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(February 2010), in Murakami v Wiryadi, 30  Spigelman CJ, delivering the primary 
judgment31 of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in a case where the plaintiff 
was seeking equitable remedies in respect of matrimonial property located in 
Australia of an Indonesian couple, took a slightly different approach. The court 
had, in addition to English and Australian authorities previously mentioned, the 
benefit of more recent academic writings,32 and more significantly, the Singapore 
Court of Appeal decision in Rickshaw. Without actually deciding the question, it 
said:33 “In determining a claim for an equitable interest under Australian law, this 
Court will have regard to, and generally enforce, a relevant foreign element in the 
dispute.” (Emphasis added). 
24. While the two cases dealt with different subject matter – fiduciary duties in 
Paramasivm v Flynn and matrimonial property in Murakami v Wiryadi – Spigelman CJ 
had proceeded on the basis that the approach in Paramasivam v Flynn was of general 
application. Subject to what the High Court of Australia may have to say about the 
matter, presently there appears to be a shift in thinking from relevant foreign law 
being applied in exceptional cases to relevant foreign law being applied generally. 
25. This brings us to the second part of this paper: how should the court decide which 
foreign law to apply? 
Choice of Law Methodology 
26. It is one thing to say that there is choice of law for equitable doctrines. It is 
another how it is to be determined which law applies. Here, it has been difficult to 
get away from the idea of equity as a distinctive body of substantive domestic law 
even for the choice of law analysis, even though as a matter of principle, it can be 
seen that it is just that: a body of substantive domestic law. Bearing in mind that 
choice of law rules are ultimately rules of domestic law; it is still theoretically 
possible that choice of law rules that apply when the court is asked to invoke its 
equitable jurisdiction are different from choice of law rules that apply in its 
common law jurisdiction.  
27. It is important to note that today, the bases of in personam jurisdiction, in the sense 
of the court having legal authority to determine a dispute in a way to bind the 
                                                            
30 [2010] NSWCA 7. 
31 MColl and Young JJA agreed. 
32 JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts (Sydney: Butterworths, 7th ed, 2006) at [2821]; A 
Chong, “The Common Law Choice of Law Rules for Resulting and Constructive Trusts” (2005) 54 ICLQ 
855; TM Yeo, Choice of Law for Equitable Doctrines (Oxford: OUP, 2004); TM Yeo, “Choice of Law for 
Equity”, in S Degeling and J Edelman, Equity in Commercial Law (Sydney: Thomson, 2005). 
33 [2010] NSWCA 7 at [148]. 
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parties, are common to both the common law and equitable jurisdiction; there is a 
single common basis of jurisdiction.  It is also important to remind ourselves that 
the purpose of the choice of law rules is to determine which law will apply; before 
that is done, we do not know whether the equitable jurisdiction is going to be 
relevant. It is not helpful to say the equity acts in personam when it is still not clear 
whether equity should act at all. In other words, equitable jurisdiction is about the 
exercise of powers under domestic substantive law. On this view, the methodology 
for determining applicable law should be neutral to the common law/equity 
distinction. In other words, there should be a unitary approach to choice of law. 
28. That is obviously not the case in Australia yet. The furthest it has gone, in 
Murakami v Wiryadi, is to give effect to foreign elements in a case; but it is still done 
outside the traditional choice of law process. The traditional process starts with 
characterisation, while its approach sidesteps it. Even so, the equitable choice of 
law rules applied 34  by the court basically referred to the existing category of 
contracts.35 Equity followed the law in this case, but there is no clear indication 
whether or how equity will do so in other instances. So its equitable choice of law 
methodology remains uncertain. 
29. The law in Singapore appears to be clearer, but still in a state of flux. In Rickshaw, 
the Court of Appeal recognised that equitable principles are pervasive in the legal 
system and that they perform a variety of functions in diverse contexts. The court 
held that:  
“where equitable duties … arise from a factual matrix where the legal 
foundation is premised on an independent established category such as contract 
or tort, the appropriate principle in so far as the choice of law is concerned 
ought to be centred on the established category concerned.” 
30. Thus, as the case concerned allegations of breach of fiduciary and confidentiality 
duties arising from a contractual relationship, the court looked to the law 
applicable to the contract to govern the equitable claims. The approach is different 
from that of the New South Wales court in Murakami v Wiryadi because the 
Singapore court had proceeded on the basis that characterisation was a necessary 
step in the analysis. At the same time, it was concerned not to foreclose the 
                                                            
34 Or more accurately, invented by the court; since this is the first time the court was applying choice of 
law in this context. 
35 The court had found that there was an actual contract to be inferred from the conduct of the parties (at 
[122]). Presumably the court applied the lex fori to the question of formation of contract; but it is not clear 




possibility of new categories to deal with equitable doctrines. While not expressly 
characterising the claims in the case, the court had necessarily characterised them at 
least indirectly by following the choice of law rules of the underlying established 
categories. While it arguably retains the relevance of equity in the choice of law 
process, the “equitable” character of the approach is marginalised because it is 
dependent upon the same categories as traditional choice of law. In other words, 
subject to the creation of new categories in the conflict of laws, equity “follows the 
law”36 in characterisation. 
31. With respect, the concern of the court in Rickshaw to leave open the possibility that 
categories may require to be created to deal specifically with problems in equity – 
“equitable categories” 37  – within the choice of law process, appears to be 
exaggerated. Choice of law categories are based on the functions of the rules and 
institutions in question; they do not depend on the historical developments in 
domestic laws.38 “Trusts” is no doubt a distinct category, but only because equity in 
this case managed to create a unique institution in the common law even in the 
functional sense, and there are functional equivalents from other legal systems that 
could fall within this category. On the other hand, it will be unnecessary and 
cumbersome for a claim for damages for breach of contract to be characterised as 
common law contracts and a defence of promissory estoppel to be characterised as 
equitable contracts. Of course, new choice of law categories may be recognised 
from time to time, but these should depend on the functions of the relevant rules 
rather than their historical origins. 
32. Subject to the possible creation of new categories specific to equity (which has not 
occurred), the approach of the Singapore court therefore involves a unitary 
                                                            
36 See A Briggs, “Misappropriated and Misapplied Assets and the Conflict of Laws” in S Degeling and J 
Edelman, Unjust Enrichment in Commercial Law (Sydney: Law Book Co, 2008); TM Yeo, Choice of Law for 
Equitable Doctrines (Oxford: OUP, 2004) at [2.06]. 
37 The creation of separate categories just to deal with equitable principles is rejected in L Collins (gen ed), 
Dicey, Morris and Collins: The Conflict of Laws (London: Thomson, 14th Ed, 2006) at [2.035] and [34.033]–
[34.041], A Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed, 2008) at 217, J Hill, International Commercial 
Disputes in English Courts (Oxford: Hart, 3rd ed, 2005) at [15.5.5]-[15.5.8] and WMV Clarkson and J Hill, 
The Conflict of Laws (Oxford: OUP, 3rd Ed, 2006) at 228 and 246–247. R Stevens, ‘Choice of Law for 
Equity: Is It Possible?’, in S Degeling and J Edelman, Equity in Commercial Law (Sydney: Thomson, 2005), 
considered its existence to be theoretically possible but left the question of its desirability open. PM 
North and JJ Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law (London: Butterworths, 13th Ed, 1999) 
at 1044 supported a category of “equitable wrongs”, but the subsequent edition took a neutral stand: JJ 
Fawcett and M Carruthers, Cheshire, North and Fawcett: Private International Law (Oxford: OUP, 14th ed, 2008) 
at 769. The strongest support for an independent category of equitable wrongs comes from L Barnard, 
“Choice of Law in Equitable Wrongs: A Comparative Analysis” [1992] CLJ 474. 
38 Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust Plc (No 3) [1996] 1 WLR 387 (CA) at 407. 
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approach to choice of law. Equitable principles are relevant only, if at all, after the 
determination of the applicable domestic law to the issue. 
33. Practically, insofar as Rickshaw supports an indirect characterization approach, it 
seems to have been bypassed by direct characterization in subsequent cases. In 
Murakami Takako v Wiryadi Louse Maria,39 there were claims that various properties 
in different countries were held on a variety of trusts. This case centred on a 
jurisdiction dispute, but as far as choice of law was concerned, the court simply 
applied the established choice of law category of matrimonial property.40 In Focus 
Energy Ltd v Aye Aye Soe,41 which also centered on the question of jurisdiction, a 
choice of law issue arose in relation to claims by a company (incorporated in the 
British Virgin Islands and registered as a foreign company in Myanmar) against a 
former director for breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of funds. The 
High Court applied the Rickshaw approach and looked to the underlying legal 
category of constitution of companies. At the same time the court also 
characterized the claim directly within the same category.42 Alternatively, the court 
also characterized the claim as falling within the category of restitution. In Shanghai 
Electric Group Co Ltd v PT Merak Energi Indonesia,43 where an equitable remedy was 
sought to restrain the exercise of a contractual right, the court simply proceeded on 
a contract characterization. It might be said that the indirect reference was an 
unspoken step in these cases. But these cases illustrate that, barring the creation of 
equity-specific categories, there is no practical difference between direct and 
indirect characterization. 
34. The approaches in recent times in a number of common law jurisdictions appear 
to be moving towards unitary characterisation approaches, even if they have not 
examined the theoretical basis for doing so as thoroughly as the Singapore Court 
of Appeal has done. Of note is the New Zealand case in A-G of England and Wales v 
R.44 A claim that a contract be set aside for undue influence was simply held to 
raise an issue of contract for choice of law purposes. This approach has been 
stigmatised as a “fusion fallacy” transgression,45 but the criticism appears to be 
directed at its reasoning (or lack thereof) rather than the approach itself. It was 
“fusion fallacy” because it simply considered there should not be any difference 
                                                            
39 [2009] 1 SLR(R) 508, [2009] 1 SLR 508 (CA). 
40 [2009] 1 SLR(R) 508, [2009] 1 SLR 508 (CA) at [29]. 
41 [2009] 1 SLR(R) 1086, [2009] 1 SLR 1086. 
42 Following Base Metal Trading Ltd v Shamurin [2004] EWCA Civ 1316, [2005] 1 All ER (Comm) 17. 
43 [2010] SGHC 2. 
44 [2002] 2 NZLR 91 (CA) at [28]-[30], affirmed in [2003] UKPC 22 without reference to the choice of 
law point. 
45 Murakami v Wiryadi [2010] NSWCA 7 at 136. 
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between common law and equity. It is not “fusion fallacy” if the differences are 
acknowledged, analysed, and found not to justify a difference of approach.  
35. More recently, the British Columbia Supreme Court in Minera Aquiline Argentina 
SA v IMA Exploration Inc,46 faced with a claim in respect of breach of confidence 
arising out of a contractual relationship, proceeded by characterising it as falling 
within the choice of law category of restitution47 without any specific regard to the 
equitable origin of the claim as such.48 In Hong Kong, Lord Hoffmann, sitting as a 
Non-Permanent Judge of the Court of Final Appeal in Tripole Trading Ltd v 
Prosperfield Ventures Ltd,49 held that a claim that property received in China was the 
subject of a constructive trust simply raised a property issue governed by the lex 
situs.  In Base Metal Trading Ltd v Shamurin, 50  the English Court of Appeal 
characterised a claim for damages for breach of a company director’s equitable 
duty of skill and care as falling within the category of constitution of companies. In 
Douglas v Hello! (No 3), 51  the English Court of Appeal characterised a claim to 
restrain a third party from breaching a duty of confidence as falling within the 
category of restitution. The case that gave the greatest consideration to the issue 
whether there was a separate category of equitable wrongs is OJSC Oil Co Yugraneft 
v Abramovich,52 where Clark J, after reviewing the authorities, took the view that a 
claim that the defendant had dishonestly assisted in a breach of trust fell within the 
category of torts for choice of law purposes.53 One could argue whether the right 
                                                            
46 2006 BSCS 1102. 
47 Following a suggestion in L Collins (gen ed), Dicey and Morris: The Conflict of Laws (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 12th ed, 1993) at 1471.  
48 The decision was upheld by the British Columbia Court of Appeal: 2007 BCCA 319. 
49 (2006) 9 HKCFAR 1 at [86]. 
50  [2004] EWCA Civ 1316, [2005] 1 All ER (Comm) 17; TM Yeo, “Choice of Law for Director’s 
Equitable Duty of Care and Concurrence” [2005] LMCLQ 144. 
51 [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125 at [96]-[102]. In the House of Lords, only Lord Hoffmann 
referred to the choice of law issue, where he affirmed the conclusions of the Court of Appeal on the 
point but without any indication of methodology: OBG v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1 at [126]. The proposition of 
the Court of Appeal that “the effect of shoehorning this type of claim in to the cause of action of breach 
of confidence means that it does not fall to be treated as a tort under English law” ([2005] EWCA Civ 
595, [2006] QB 125 at [96]), however, commits the fallacy of using domestic characterization to control 
choice of law characterization. It would follow from this that an agreement without consideration cannot 
be treated as a contract for choice of law purposes, a conclusion which contradicts Re Bonacina [1912] 2 
Ch 394 (CA) and much of the received wisdom in private international law; see particularly the caution of 
Auld LJ in Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust Plc (No 3) [1996] 1 WLR 387 (CA) at 407: 
“classification of an issue and  rule  of  law  for  this  purpose,  the  underlying  principle  of  which  is  to  
strive  for  comity  between  competing  legal systems, should not be constrained by particular notions or 
distinctions of the domestic law of the lex fori, or that of the competing system of law, which may have no 
counterpart in the other’s system.” 
52 [2008] EWHC 2613 (Comm). 
53 The question was whether the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (which 
reformed the choice of law rules for torts) applied, which in turned depended on whether the issue raised 
was, as a matter of characterization at common law, one of “tort”. 
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categories were invoked in each of these cases, but in each, the court saw no need 
to create new categories just to deal with equitable issues. Of greater practical 
significance to the UK is the European choice of law regime for obligations: the 
Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations54 and the 
Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations,55 
together which cover almost the entire field of obligations today. The European 
Court of Justice, the final interpretative body for the Regulations, is very unlikely 
to take the view that an equitable obligation is neither contractual nor non-
contractual and thereby fall outside the two Regulations.56 I say very little about the 
law in the United States, where the choice of law methodology is very different and 
characterisation plays a minimal role: generally, equitable doctrines are not seen to 
raise any special choice of law issues at all. 
36. The objection in principle to having separate choice of law rules (or separate 
choice of law categories) for equity is one of principle. Choice of law rules must 
determine the applicability of domestic systems of law, including (if any) its 
principles of equity. Having separate equitable choice of law rules puts the cart 
before the horse.  
37. There are further difficulties in trying to apply a choice of law scheme which 
differentiates between equitable and non-equitable obligations or interests, whether 
at the level of approach, or at the level of choice of categories. The most 
problematic one is whether the court should characterise on the basis of the 
plaintiff’s or the defendant’s case. For example, the plaintiff may argue that its 
claim is based on an equitable principle according to the law argued by the plaintiff 
to be applicable (by reason of “equitable” choice of law rules or categories), while 
the defendant’s case is that under the relevant applicable law (by reason of other 
choice of law rules or categories), the plaintiff’s case does not depend on any 
equitable principle. The second is that some obligations have mixed origins. 
Examples include penalties in contract law, and the duty of disclosure in insurance 
contracts. If different choice of law rules or categories apply depending on whether 
one is raising an “equitable“ or non-equitable issue, the question is simply 
                                                            
54 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I) of 17 June 2008, OJ L 177/6 (4 July 2008) with effect from 17 
December 2009, superseding the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations: 
Contracts  (Applicable  Law)  Act  1990,  c  36,  Sch;  OJ  L266  (9  October  1980). 
55 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) of 11 
July 2007, OJ L199/40 (31 July 2007), with effect from 11 January 2009. 
56  A Rushworth and A Scott, “Rome II: Choice of Law for Non-Contractual Obligations” [2008] 
LMCLQ 274; A Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation: The Law Applicable to Non Contractual Obligations (Oxford: 
OUP, 2008) at [4.99]-[4.106]; A Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (Oxford:OUP, 2nd ed, 2008) at 207. 
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impossible to answer without some arbitrariness.57 No jurisdiction applying the 
traditional methodology has found it necessary to create “equitable” categories yet.  
38. Yet, at the same time, as a matter of doctrine, the equitable jurisdiction still exists 
separately.58 But there is no reason why the same choice of law rules should not 
apply whether in the common law or equitable jurisdiction of the court. The first 
step towards this is to say, as the New South Wales Court of Appeal just did, that 
equity will follow the law. The second step is that already taken by the Singapore 
Court of Appeal, that equity will adopt the same choice of law methodology. The 
third step is disappearance of the significance of “equity” in the choice of law 
process. This comes with the recognition that while fresh categories may be 
created from time to time to deal with new problems, “equity” in choice of law 
merely raises many “old” problems within existing categories of choice of law 
(contracts, wrongs, restitution, property, succession, matrimonial property, etc). 
This is not fusion, but harmonisation, between common law and equity. 
Conclusion 
39. With increasing Europeanisation, English common law (including principles of 
equity) is becoming of decreasing significance to Singapore (and indeed to the UK 
itself), and Singapore needs to look progressively to other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions for guidance, and has indeed done so. At the same time, Singapore is 
poised to make important contributions to Commonwealth jurisprudence as well. 
Private international law is one (but not the only) area where Singapore has made 
its mark and continues to do so. Rickshaw follows Thahir Kartika Ratna v PT 
Pertambanan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina),59 as a Singapore case that has 
made others sit up. The leading Australian text on private international law urges 
the Australian courts to follow the Rickshaw decision as one that “contains perhaps 
the fullest theoretical consideration of the question of choice of law in respect of 
equitable obligations”. 60  The New South Wales Court of Appeal 61  was clearly 
influenced by Rickshaw in its own decision to break away from older authorities 
denying any choice of law in equity. Arguably, the New South Wales decision has 
not gone as far as Rickshaw in adopting (either by direct characterisation or 
indirectly by equity “following the law”) the traditional choice of law methodology, 
but its actual approach is at least consistent with the indirect characterisation 
                                                            
57 Or, the development of another layer of rules: choice of choice of law rules. 
58 At least in most common law countries, including Singapore. 
59 [1994] 3 SLR(R) 312, [1994] 3 SLR 257 (CA). 
60 M Davies, AS Bell and PLG Brereton, Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia (Sydney: LexisNexis, 8th ed, 
2010), at [21.2] and [21.17]. 
61 Murakami v Wiryadi [2010] NSWCA 7. 
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interpretation of Rickshaw. But the common law develops continuously and 
incrementally, and the chapter is not closed yet. Even in Singapore and elsewhere, 
much work remains to be done in deciding how various equitable doctrines and 
principles are to be characterised. It is much harder work being a pluralist than a 
universalist, but it is all well worth the effort. 
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